The Ashikaga Shogunate
1336-1573


 
The Kamakura Shogunate
[Minamoto no] Yoritomo established the shogunate on firm foundations, but did not succeed in founding a dynasty of shoguns. He killed off rivals within his own family, but his death in 1199 was followed by a struggle for power.
       Emerging victorious was the Hojo, the family of Yoritomo’s remarkable, strong-minded widow, Masako
(1157-1225), who herself dominated shogunal politics for a time and was dubbed the nun shogun. Her father became the first in a line of de facto Hojo rulers, although they never assumed the office of shogun. That was held by a puppet, who after 1219 was not even a Minamoto, because in that year a Fujiwara infant received the appointment. Meanwhile, the Hojo, by placing family members in key posts, exercised control over the bakufu. In this way, real power was doubly divorced from apparent authority: in theory Japan was ruled by an emperor, but this emperor was actually under the control of his abdicated father (the retired emperor); meanwhile, in Kamakura, the other locus of government, the power ostensibly “delegated” to the shogun was actually exercised by Hojo ministers. [BHJC, 83-4]


The Mongol Invasions

In 1266, even before the conquest of the Southern Song had been completed, Khubilai Khan dispatched his first messenger to Japan demanding submission. This threat produced great consternation at court in Kyoto, but the shogunate remained calm, determined to resist. It took the Mongols until 1274 to organize a military expedition, but in that year a force of about 30,000 was sent to Japan. They landed near Hakata, in northern Kyushu, and fought briefly with a Japanese force assembled by the bakufu but consisting mostly of local warriors. Fortunately for the Japanese, a great storm destroyed this expedition. Heavy casualties did not deter Khubilai Khan from trying again. He renewed his demands only to meet with rebuff; the Japanese showed their determination to resist by executing his envoys. In 1281 Khubilai sent a much larger force, estimated at 140,000 men, to crush the Japanese. But the shogunate, too, had used the intervening years in military preparation: they built a stone wall along Hakata Bay, amassed troops, and trained them in the techniques of group fighting employed by the Mongols, which contrasted with the individual combat customary in Japanese warfare. They fought for seven weeks before nature intervened once more; another great storm, called the kamikaze (“divine wind”) by the Japanese, settled the issue. About half the men sent by Khubilai perished in this fruitless attempt to add Japan to his empire. [BHJC, 85]
 
In repulsing these attacks, the shogunate achieved a great success and further increased its power vis-à-vis the civilian court. But it had to share the glory of victory with temples and shrines, which claimed credit for securing divine intervention. Indeed, the notion of Japan as a special land protected by its deities gained currency from this time....For the shogunate, however, the Mongol invasions proved its eventual undoing. Fighting the Mongol invaders, unlike internal warfare, brought in no new lands or booty with which to meet the expectations of warriors demanding their just rewards. When the shogunate proved unable to satisfy warrior claims, the bushi lost confidence in the regime. Their loyalty was weakened, and as they increasingly turned for support increasingly to local authorities (military governors and the stronger stewards), centrifugal forces came to the fore. [BHJC, 85]

 
 
 
Between the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunates, as earlier between the Heian and Kamakura periods, there was a brief interlude. The Kenmu (Kemmu) Restoration of Emperor Go-Daigo (1288-1339) was an attempt to reassert the prerogatives of the throne similar to the earlier efforts of Emperor Go-Toba. Because it confronted a much weakened shogunate, the restoration had considerable initial success. Even after Kyoto was lost, there was sufficient momentum to sustain a government in exile in the mountains of Yoshino, south of Nara, which for over half a century provided at least a potential rallying point for those opposed to the Ashikaga. Not until 1392 did it come to an end. [BHJC, 101]
 
Fighting began in 1331 when the shogunate tried to force Go-Daigo to abdicate. At first Go-Daigo suffered setbacks, including capture and exile to the Oki Islands in the Sea of Japan. But the bakufu was unable to suppress Go-Daigo’s coalition....He returned to Kyoto in triumph after Ashikaga Takauji (1305-1358), commander of a bakufu force sent to destroy him, changed sides....Another important Go-Daigo warrior ally, Nitta Yoshisada (1301-1338), seized Kamakura in the name of Go-Daigo and put an end to the power of the Hojo family and to the Kamakura bakufu.

When Go-Daigo adopted a policy to merge military and civil power and put it in the hands of civil governors, however, his warrior supporters were dismayed. When he appointed his own son shogun, Takauji’s support for him dwindled, and the throne’s policies cost him the military support required for his survival. The Kenmu Restoration came to an end in 1336 when Takauji defeated Nitta Yoshisada and then dethroned Go-Daigo. Go-Daigo escaped south to the mountains of Yoshino, and with his remaining followers occasionally mounted an offense against the Ashikaga forces for more than fifty years. [BHJC, 102]


 
The principal war tale that narrates the fighting between, first, the supporters of Go-Daigo and of the Kamakura shogunate and, later, after the failure of the Kenmu Restoration, those of the Northern and Southern Courts is the Taiheiki (Chronicles of Great Peace). The Taiheiki is often thought to be a tract whose anonymous author or authors argue that the Southern, and not the Northern, Court was the legitimate seat of imperial authority between 1336 and 1392. But the Taiheiki does not explicitly declare the Southern Court to be legitimate; rather, it portrays a group of warrior heroes whose loyalty to Go-Daigo and, subsequently, the Southern Court was of such a superbly self-sacrificing, admirable character that later generations of Japanese believed the Southern Court was legitimate in large part because they could not believe that such heroes could have fought and died for an “illegitimate” cause. Foremost among the Taiheiki’s loyalist heroesand indeed, the man regarded as Japan’s greatest hero until at least the end of World War IIwas Kusunoki Masashige (d. 1336). [SJT, 284]

The Death of Kusunoki Masashige
After failure of the Kenmu Restoration in 1336, Go-Daigo...rejects Masashige’s advice about strategy and insists that he and Nitta Yoshisada, the leading loyalist general, meet in a showdown battle with Ashikaga Takauji at Minatogawa in Hyogo. Masashige obeys with the knowledge that he will die in this battle, and symbolically, so also will Go-Daigo’s cause. [SJT, 287]
 
The thirteen members of the Kusunoki family and their sixty retainers aligned themselves in two rows in the six-bay reception hall. Reciting the nembutsu ten times in unison, they cut their bellies as one. Masashige, occupying the seat of honor, turned to his brother Masasue. “Well now, it is said that one’s last thoughts in this life determine the goodness or evil of one’s next incarnation. Into which of the nine realms of existence would you like to be reborn?” Laughing loudly, Masasue replied: “It is my wish to be reborn again and again for seven lives into this same existence in order to destroy the enemies of the court!” Masashige was greatly pleased. “Although it is deeply sinful, it is also my wish. Let us therefore be born again into this life to fulfill our cherished dream!” Stabbing each other, the brothers fell down on the same pillow.
       Sixteen men from prominent families, including Hashimoto Hachiro Masakazu, the governor of Kawachi, Usami Masayasu, Jinguji Taro Masamoro, and Wada Goro Masataka, along with fifty of their followers, lined up in a row, each in his own way, and cut their bellies.
       Kikuchi Shichiro Taketomo had come as the emissary of his older brother, the governor of Hizen, to observe the fighting at Suma-guchi and happened upon Masashige’s seppuku. How, he thought, could he shamelessly forsake Masashige and return home? And so he too committed suicide and fell into the flames.
 
 
…Masashige, a man combining the three virtues of wisdom, benevolence, and courage, whose fidelity is unequaled by anyone from ancient times to the present, has chosen death as the proper way. His and his brother’s deaths by suicide are omens that a sagely sovereign has again lost the country and traitorous subjects are running amok. [SJT, 290-291]
 
 
It is characteristic of the age that the Ashikaga downfall came not at the hands of a more powerful family or coalition but as the result of disputes within its own ranks. In 1464 Yoshimasa, still without an heir, designated his brother as next in line, but the following year his ambitious and strong-minded wife [Tomiko] bore him a son. Anxious to have her son be the next shogun, she found support in a powerful provincial governor’s family, while another family backed the older claimant. Thus the ground was prepared for the succession struggle that produced the disastrous Onin War. The outcome of the war did not lead to the triumph of either family, but it did destroy the authority of the Ashikaga as well as half of the city of Kyoto, and it wreaked havoc on much of the surrounding country. [BHJC, 110]